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ABSTRACT 
In the second half of 2018 during the increments 56 and 57 the German ESA Astronaut Alexander Gerst 
was living and working on ISS. During these ISS increments – A. Gerst served as ISS Commander during 
Incr. 57 – two events concerning the safety of the astronauts onboard as well as on the way to and from 
ISS were perceived by the public: 
• A hole in the Soyuz capsule which could be closed in short timeframe without impact to the 
astronauts 
• The launch abort of Soyuz 56 (MS-10) with safe landing of the cosmonaut/astronaut crew 
Despite these events were outside of the responsibility of the Columbus Control Center (Col-CC) they also 
puts the focus on the safety responsibility of Col-CC and especially the Columbus Flight Director. 
The safe execution of activities on board the International Space Station (ISS), whether performed by 
astronauts or directly from ground, is the first priority for the Flight Control Team supporting human 
spaceflight operations. Safety of the crew, the vehicle and the mission is actually one of the first things new 
flight controllers learn when joining the project.  At the Columbus Control Center (Col-CC) in Munich, 
Germany, this task is assigned to the Columbus Flight Director. In order to fulfil this task, an integrated 
process takes place in which several teams are involved. Its outcome is then made available to the 
Columbus Flight Director who, supported by his team, ensures its implementation for the safe operations 
performed on behalf of the European Space Agency (ESA) inside as well as outside of the European 
module Columbus. 
This paper intends mainly at describing the safety role of the Columbus Flight director. It will briefly 
describe the above mentioned safety process in place on ESA side and then detail the operational means 
made available to the Columbus Flight Director and the Flight Control Team at Col-CC to ensure safe 
operations onboard the ISS. 
 
Introduction 
During the more than ten years of operations of the 
Columbus module at the ISS, the Columbus 
Control Center (Col-CC) has supported 10 long-
duration and one short-duration mission with 9 
different ESA astronauts. Paolo Nespoli and 
Alexander Gerst were supported twice during this 
timeframe. All ESA astronauts of the 2009 class 
have performed at least one space mission and 
provided high valuable results during their stay on 
the ISS. Based on the long experience of DLR’s 
German Space Operations Center (GSOC) in 
manned space operations and the missions to ISS 
described below, Col-CC is supporting also the 
current mission “Horizons” with Alexander Gerst 
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until December 2018. Alexander Gerst will become 
the first German Commander of the ISS; this will 
be the second ESA astronaut as commander on 
ISS after Frank de Winne in 2009. 
In the Interim Utilization Phase, which was done in 
parallel to setting up Col-CC ([4] to [6]) for the later 
Columbus operations, the Eneide Mission in 2005 
and the Astrolab mission with Thomas Reiter in 
2006 (see [1] and [2]) were successfully supported. 
Since February 2008, when Col-CC started its 
Columbus operations (see [7] to [12] and [14] to 
[19]), all further missions and increments have 
been prepared and supported successfully. With 
this experience Col-CC will be able to operate 
Columbus in the course of the next decade, 
assuming that the basic setup will not change (see 
[13]). 
European Astronauts on ISS 
On 6 June 2018 Alexander Gerst was launched to 
space in Soyuz-MS09 (55S) together with his crew 
mates Serena Auñón-Chancellor and Sergei 
Prokopyev. The first half of the stay on-board ISS 
(see [18] and [19]) was a quite normal increment 
on ISS performing several experiments like GRIP 
and GRASP. Starting End of August 2019 two 
events took place that makes Increments 56&57 
special in the row of increments in the past years.  
• On August 30, 2018, a hole in the Soyuz 
capsule was detected which could be 
closed in short timeframe without impact to 
the astronauts 
• The launch abort of Soyuz 56 (MS-10) on 
October 11, 2018, with safe landing of the 
cosmonaut/astronaut crew (see Fig. 1) 
The whole ISS community and all you get notice of 
these events were relieved to hear that the 
astronauts and cosmonauts were not harmed by 
this events. Especially the launch abort showed 
the necessity of reliable safeguard systems for 
manned launchers. 
These events have large impacts on the on-board 
work and schedule, e.g. by reduced crew size for 
several months or an extra EVA to gather more 
data on the hole in the Soyuz, while other EVAs 
have to be postponed. 
Due to the launch abort and therefore late arrival of 
the next crew the landing of Soyuz 55 with the 
crew members Alexander Gerst, Serena Auñón-
Chancellor and Sergei Prokopyev was postponed 
to 20 December 2018. The expedition 57 crew 
members returned safely to earth with Soyuz 
MS09 (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 1: Soyuz 56 Launch Abort (Photo: NASA) 
Until the arrival of Expedition 59 in March 2019 the 
on-board schedule was impacted by the launch 
abort, because some of the planned experiments 
and maintenance activities have to be postponed 
until the nominal crew size was reached again.  
This was achieved with the launch of Soyuz 58 on 
14 March 2019 bringing the three crew members 
A. Ovchinin, N. Hague and C. Koch to ISS. 
 
Fig. 2: Landing of Soyuz 55 (Photos: NASA) 
The events described above showed that on-board 
and launch safety is of high importance for human 
spaceflight operations. The Columbus module 
forms only a small part of the overall ISS but its 
role as working place for the astronauts and home 
for more than 10 Payload racks leads to lot of 
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challenges with respect to safety in preparation 
and the execution phase of Columbus operations. 
The role of the Columbus Flight Director and his 
responsibility for the on-board safety in the 
Columbus module will be described in the next 
chapters.  
 
Columbus Flight Director 
A flight director manages a team called the Flight 
Control Team composed of experts in various 
systems in order to achieve a defined set of goals 
for a dedicated space mission.  
The Columbus Flight Director (COL FLIGHT) 
directs his team at Col-CC in the frame of space 
mission including men and women in space which 
adds another degree of complexity to the flight 
director task in comparison to unmanned space 
mission. In this case, we are no longer talking 
about a pure space system to be operated from 
ground but we are adding a human in the loop 
which induces additional operational constraints to 
be considered. The Columbus Flight director needs 
to ensure that all operations done from Col-CC are 
done in a safe manner for the astronaut.  
The Columbus flight control team has amongst 
other tasks to guarantee the overall safe Columbus 
module operation (systems and payloads) as part 
of the ISS operation. This task is supported by the 
Flight Control Team, including ESA external 
centres (e.g. User Support and Operation Centre 
responsible for science operations) for their 
payloads and experiment. Even though safety is 
the task of all involved in the ISS operations, 
ultimately the Col Flight Director is responsible to 
guarantee the safe operations from Col-CC. This 
task is done under the overall supervision of the 
ISS Flight Director who has the final authority on all 
decisions made for ISS operations   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety and Hazard Definitions 
Before defining the safety role of the Columbus 
Flight director, it is necessary to define what safety 
and hazards are in the frame of the ISS project.   
The ISS Safety Requirements Document (SSP 
51721) defines the term Safety as “A general term 
denoting an acceptable level of risk, relative 
freedom from, and low probability of: personal 
injury; fatality; damage to property; or loss of 
function to critical equipment”. In other words 
Safety is there to mitigate the hazards present on 
board the ISS by implemented controls which limit 
the risk of the hazard to occur.  
The ISS program has defined several Hazard 
categories (e.g. Electrical hazard, Mechanical 
hazard, Toxic hazard) which are categorized as 
either Catastrophic, Critical or Marginal Hazards.  
These Hazards are all defined in so called Hazard 
reports which contain amongst other information a 
description of the Hazard, the consequence of 
Hazard and most importantly for operations, the 
control in place to avoid the Hazard to occur.  
These controls are simply called Hazard controls 
and are divided into 2 groups 
1. Design Hazard Controls 
These controls are implemented in the hardware 
design. They are typically dealing with Fault 
Tolerance (e.g. redundancy in the design, Fail 
Safe) or Design for Minimum Risk (e.g. Proof 
testing).  
2. Operational Hazard Controls 
These controls are to be implemented by the 
operational teams in the OPS Products (e.g. Flight 
Rules, Procedures) or by training. The 
implementation of operational controls needs to be 
agreed with the respective teams.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Col FLIGHT console at COL-CC (Photo: German Zoeschinger) 
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The Flight Control Team needs to understand and 
agree before implementing these controls  in their 
OPS products. That way, it ensures that the flight 
controller has the full information available when 
the procedure will be executed during real time 
operation under the supervision of the Columbus 
Flight Director.  
Safe operations 
The ISS normal flight operations are conducted 
according to the station operational flight rules 
which are defined as a set of decisions made in 
advance to minimize real time discussions. When 
time or circumstances do not permit to follow them, 
the rule B1-3 defining Real time operation policy 
states that decisions which have to be made have 
to comply with the following priorities 
1. Crew safety 
2. Vehicle safety 
3. Protection of the vehicle equipment lifetime 
4. Continue with planned operations 
 
This rule dictates us that safe execution of 
activities on board the International Space Station 
(ISS), whether performed by astronauts or directly 
from ground, is the highest priority for the Flight 
Control Team supporting human spaceflight 
operations.   
In line with this Flight rule B1-3, the Col-CC 
operations execution strategy emphasizes first and 
foremost safety of the crew and vehicle. 
Operations are conducted by dedicated teams 
composed of certified members, each with their 
allocated tasks. The Flight Controllers ensure that 
operations of Columbus payloads and systems are 
executed in a safe manner, consistent with the 
established Flight Rules and other OPS Products. 
Whenever an activity is conducted on board the 
ISS, whether performed from ground or by the 
crew, the ops community is using procedures. All 
these procedures are following a process which 
shall ensure that, amongst other things, all hazards 
which might occur while executing the procedure 
are understood and have their associated 
operational hazard control as explained before, 
(e.g. an obvious example would be for electrical 
shock hazard to have a procedure step to 
deactivate a power outlet before the astronaut 
executes the step to demate a power cable). When 
it comes to executing such a procedure, it is the 
task of the Columbus Flight Director to ensure that 
this is done as they are written and intended to be 
executed. During real time operations, any 
deviation from a procedure shall be mentioned by 
the procedure executor and shall be approved by 
the Flight director prior to execution. In order to be 
able to approve such deviation, it is primordial for 
the flight director to have a clear understanding on 
the following: does the procedure being executed 
contain one or several hazard control steps; if so 
what is the associated hazard; if the current 
configuration on board would allow to deviate from 
the nominal procedure execution.  
To help the Flight director in this task, the Product 
Assurance and Safety Officer (PASO) provides 
real-time Columbus safety support, e.g. on a daily 
basis with a safety briefing to the flight control 
team. This briefing shall contain all Hazard control 
planned to be executed on a given day as well as 
the Hazard level response (see Hazardous release 
section) of hardware to be handled by the 
astronaut. This information is used by the 
Columbus Flight Director to have an awareness of 
the safety related items to be handled throughout 
that given day.  
 
Hazardous commanding 
There are several kinds of commands which can 
be executed on the ISS. One of them is classified 
as Hazardous commanding when matching the 
following criteria:  
- the command is one whose execution 
(including inadvertent, out-of-sequence, or 
incorrect execution) could lead to an 
identified critical or catastrophic hazard, 
- the execution of the command can lead to 
a reduction in the control of a hazard 
(including reduction in failure tolerance 
against a hazard or the elimination of an 
inhibit against a hazard). 
On a standard basis, a flight controller would 
request the authorization to the Flight director to 
start with a commanding activity and after receiving 
the authorization to proceed would only report to 
him/her upon activity completion. However for 
hazardous commanding, the flight controller is 
required to request the Flight Director approval for 
each hazardous command before the command 
can be sent to the ISS.  
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Before giving the approval, the Flight director 
needs to understand here as well, what is the 
associated hazard of the command, what situation 
it will create and if that situation is acceptable at 
that time. In that case, the Flight director cannot 
solely rely on OPS Product but must have a full 
awareness of the actual on board configuration of 
the system or payload to be commanded and if 
anything being done on board the ISS could lead 
to a hazardous situation (e.g. the hazardous 
command is meant to change the fan speed which 
create the air flow required for smoke detection or 
is meant to activate a power outlet on a hardware 
the astronaut is working on). This awareness has 
to be continuously maintained by the Flight director 
in order to be able to judge such situation. This 
means having cognizance of the on board 
configuration at any given time and what is 
currently being done by the astronaut on board the 
ISS.  
56S Launch mishap 
On October 11th 2018 the Soyuz MS-10, carrying 
part of the Expedition 57 crew (Roscosmos 
cosmonaut Aleksey Ovchinin and NASA astronaut 
Nick Hague) suffered a malfunction due to a failure 
of the Soyuz-FG rocket shortly after launch. The 
launch was aborted and the crew was put in a 
ballistic re-entry trajectory. The crew was extracted 
from the capsule several minutes later in good 
shape and reported no injury. The only impacts 
were the loss of the vehicle and the abortion of the 
mission to the Station. Following this mishap, 
NASA started the effort to consider the impacts 
and the preparation steps needed to support a 
possible decrew of the Station. 
The COL FLIGHT team was actively involved in 
this preparation and requested assessment to be 
made regarding the safety of the Columbus 
module in the scenario where no astronaut would 
be present on board the ISS. In this exercise, 
various failure cases were analysed and the team 
had to assess whether the safety of the Columbus 
module/ISS would be jeopardized.  
In case it would have been required to decrew the 
ISS, per standard procedure the Columbus module 
would have been isolated from the rest of the ISS 
by having its hatch closed by an astronaut prior to 
departure(similar approach is taken for all modules 
to avoid that a failure is one module could 
propagate to other modules). Taking into account 
this configuration, it was also required to assess if 
the configuration of the Columbus module could be 
controlled from ground to allow an astronauts to 
come back on board of the ISS and reopen the 
Columbus hatch to enter the module safely. For 
this part of the analysis, items like battery 
expiration date were taken into account to 
minimize the risk of these leaking in the Columbus 
cabin. We also assessed one failure deeper 
scenario where we for example anticipated the 
possibility that Col-CC would be unable for 
technical reason (e.g. hardware issue at Col-CC) 
to command the Columbus module while crew 
would come back on board the ISS and made sure 
that they would have the means on board to 
command the Columbus module prior to reopening 
its hatch.  
As one of the main goals of the ISS is to allow 
science experiments to run it was also important to 
assess which operations can be executed while no 
astronaut would be on board the ISS to assist with 
troubleshooting in case of anomaly. In other words, 
the assessment had also to cover which system or 
payload can be operated from ground only without 
taking risk of having it in an unsafe state and 
unrecoverable from ground. As part of this 
analysis, we were actually able to safely guarantee 
the usage of the venting/vacuum line for 
experiments which was so far not allowed in the 
decrew configuration.  
 
Cabin depressurization  
On August 30th 2018, during the sleeping period of 
the astronaut, the MCC-H Flight Control Team 
observed a slow decrease of the ISS cabin 
pressure. The leak rate was low enough that the 
decision was taken not to wake up the astronaut 
and inform them about the leak and ask them to 
locate the source only at standard wake up time. 
After confirming that the leak was on the Russian 
Segment side, astronauts executed the related 
emergency response procedure to further isolate 
the leak. The procedure led to isolating the leak in 
the orbital module of the 55S Soyuz. The 
astronauts were able later on to stop the leak and 
nominal operations could be resumed.  
For such an event, it is a common effort between 
the astronauts on board the ISS and the ground 
teams located across the world to react 
accordingly and ensure the safety of the crew. For 
that specific event on August 30th 2018, even 
though the COL-Flight Control Team had a relative 
passive role as the leak was located in the Russian 
Segment, COL FLIGHT ensured that his team was 
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closely following the emergency procedure 
executed by the astronauts and while the leak 
source was still unknown, COL FLIGHT directed 
his team to assess any relevant indication from the 
on board telemetry that could help identify the leak 
source.  
This scenario of cabin depressurization is defined 
as one of the three technical emergency cases 
defined for ISS operations (rapid depress, fire, 
hazardous release) where the safety of the 
astronauts is in jeopardy.  
 
Hazardous release 
This section intends at highlighting the safety role 
of the Columbus Flight Director whenever 
hazardous materials are operated by an astronaut.  
The ISS program has defined five (0 to 4) different 
Hazard response levels (HRL) to be executed by 
an astronaut whenever in contact with a hazardous 
material. These HRL are assessed based on the 
toxicity, flammability and bio safety criteria of the 
material. Each HRL has an associated response to 
be performed by the astronaut in case the 
hazardous substance of the manipulated hardware 
is released in the cabin. The corresponding 
hardware is identified accordingly with a label 
visible to the astronaut. On ground, these labels 
are not always visible even when real time 
operations are conducted with real time video 
support. In order to know the corresponding HRL 
associated with the hardware being operating by 
the astronaut, the Columbus Flight director has 
access a database which lists all hazardous 
materials on board the ISS.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Hazard labels 
 
The need of a full awareness of the on board 
configuration and what the astronaut is doing on 
board the ISS was mentioned before when dealing 
with Hazardous command. This awareness is also 
required in the scenario of a hazardous release to 
the atmosphere and can be achieved in various 
ways (e.g. based on astronaut reporting on an 
activity status, by having real time video support). 
Using all possible means, the Columbus Flight 
director has to ensure that when handling 
hazardous materials, the astronaut will never be 
exposed to them or in case the associated HRL is 
level 1 or higher, the level of containment of the 
hazardous material is met (e.g. HRL 1 requires 2 
level of containment, HRL 2 and 3 require 3 level 
of containment). In case of off-nominal situation 
where the crew is in contact with the hazardous 
substance or the required level of containment is 
not met, it is the responsibility of the Columbus 
Flight director to ensure that the astronaut is aware 
of the hazardous situation if not already the case 
and that the appropriate malfunction response is 
properly executed. In a nutshell COL FLIGHT 
makes sure that the astronaut knows the related 
HRL associated to the situation, instructs the crew 
to which steps shall be performed on the 
procedure to recover the situation (this is 
applicable in case the procedure being executed 
covers the potential case of a hazardous release) 
or point the crew towards the generic emergency 
response procedure (procedure written for generic 
case, i.e. also for unknown substance release). 
Additionally, the Columbus Flight Director makes 
sure that the ISS Flight director is kept informed on 
the situation and the recovery plan.  
Conclusion 
Two major anomalies with the 56S launch mishap 
and the cabin atmosphere leak in the 55S occurred 
in the increments 56-57. These events which could 
have directly impacted the astronaut safety 
reminded the ESA Flight Control Team of the 
important role of the Columbus Flight Director who 
is responsible for the safe execution of all activities 
in Columbus as well as for all operations 
conducted from Col-CC. 
When it comes to hazardous situation on a 
manned mission, the impact of the decision taken 
by a flight director can not only impact the ISS itself 
but can also have consequences on the astronauts 
who are living up there. These decisions, if not 
done properly and in a timely manner, could lead 
to injury or worst. Therefore, it requires a 
significant amount of work in term of training, 
preparation and during activity execution for each 
Columbus Flight director to be able to cope with 
the associated responsibilities. This is especially 
true for new mission objectives or even new 
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mission goals like moon and deep space. The 
required effort and the necessary experience of the 
ground teams to ensure the safety of the crew 
have to be taken into account from the first step of 
mission design. Past manned space missions are 
there to remind us that mistakes can lead to 
human loss and that it is the responsibility of the 
flight directors together with their team to ensure 
that this will never happen again. The Columbus 
Operations setup at GSOC is using the experience 
from past manned missions, e.g. Spacelab D1 / D2 
and Euromir-95-Mission. In the same way the 
current experience from Col-CC for safety will help 
for the European contribution for future missions 
like deep space gateway. 
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